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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
The impact of conflict and violence on foreign direct investment (FDI) is not a topic that 
has been done justice by the literature, and what few studies exist have contradictory 
results. This paper studies the impact that transnational terrorism has on FDI inflows by 
economic sector, in developed countries. Results indicate a statistically significant 
negative correlation between terrorist events and total FDI inflows. Amongst a list of 12 
broad industrial sectors, FDI inflows for manufacturing, trade and repair, and 
construction were found to have a statistically significant negative correlation with 
terrorist events. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The last twenty five years have witnessed an unprecedented expansion of economic 
integration across the world, and the combination of rapid advances in information and 
communications technology along with economic liberalization in many countries has 
dramatically reduced the cost of doing business on a global scale and created new and 
exciting opportunities for business firms. 
 
The two most common measures of economic globalization are global trade and 
foreign direct investment (FDI), both of which have grown much faster than global GDP 
since 1985. Within them, FDI has grown even faster than global trade, largely because of 
privatization of public-sector enterprises and liberalization of foreign investment rules in 
many countries. It can be argued that FDI has an even more lasting impact on economic 
development of local economies than trade, mainly because host countries receive not 
just capital flows but also new technologies, products and management skills. On the 
other side, FDI allows companies to grow beyond the limitation of their national markets, 
produce products more cheaply, and enjoy greater economies of scale. 
 
Despite some concerns about how effective FDI has been in helping poor 
countries tackle poverty, it is by now largely recognized that FDI is a net positive for 
both the host country and the investing company.  At a minimum, FDI has created what 
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Levitt (1993) calls a “new commercial reality”, which is the production and distribution 
of goods on a scale that was previously unimagined.   
 
Over the last two decades, major changes have occurred in the nature, direction 
and even source of global FDI  flows, the most profound change being FDI flows are 
increasingly going to developing countries rather than developed countries.  Annual FDI 
flows to all developing countries in the 1970s used to be on average less than $10 billion, 
but that figure is now more than half a trillion a year.  A significant milestone was 
crossed in 2010 when, for the first time, developing and transition economies received 
more than half of all global FDI flows, especially China, India and Southeast Asia 
(UNCTAD, 2011).  
 
There is a large body of literature on why companies invest abroad, especially 
why they take the trouble of establishing operations in a foreign (and usually new) 
location when they could also sell by exporting  There are also many studies on the 
impact of government incentives and subsidies on FDI.  However, one of the more 
interesting challenges in understanding the growth of global FDI is the fact that violence 
and terrorism have also become more acute public concerns in the last twenty five years, 
especially since the 9/11 terror bombing in New York city in 2001.  Since then, terror 
attacks have either occurred or been uncovered before they happened in London, Madrid, 
Berlin, Mumbai, Jakarta, Bali and even Moscow.  Technological advancements now 
allow terrorists to acquire advanced weaponry with greater ease and inflict large-scale 
damage. 
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There are probably a large number factors that motivate foreign investment 
decisions, and potential FDI investors have to in the end weigh their perception of 
expected returns and all risks associated with the venture. Conflict and acts of terror 
generate fear and economic uncertainty, and are at least on paper clear disincentives for 
investors.  Wagner (2006) describes the factors which influence this uncertainty as “the 
economic health of the investment destination, the difficulty associated with doing 
business in a given country, the existence of rule of law and good corporate governance, 
the existence of corporate and government connections, and of course the cost of 
production.”  These factors are all prevalent indicators of developed countries, implying 
that FDI decision makers differentiate between developed and developing countries, 
when assessing the level of country risk. 
 
However, political terrorism, especially in the European and Anglo-Saxon 
context, is a relatively new phenomenon. This is why there is a need to understand the 
empirical linkage between FDI flows and terrorism, especially in the modern geopolitical 
context.  This study aims to understand the impact of violent conflict, in the form of 
terrorist acts, and FDI flows in developed countries.  
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is a survey of previous literature in 
this area; Section 3 explains the data collection method; Section 4 presents the empirical 
testing of the methodology and results; Section 5 presents the analysis of the findings; 
Section 6 ends with some conclusions. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
Early literature on FDI has tended to overlook the phenomenon of violent conflict, either 
focusing on political risks associated with corruption and government action or on 
quantifiable economic indicators such as per capita income and inflation.  It is only in 
recent years that there have there been some attempts to study and explore the 
macroeconomic impact of political conflict. 
 
In a study on Spain and Greece, Enders and Sandler (1996) report that an 
“atmosphere of intimidation and heightened financial risk” causes investors to invest 
elsewhere in order to protect themselves from losses, and results in a reduction in FDI 
inflows. This study has attempted to quantify the impact of terrorism on FDI flows by 
using time-series analysis – transfer function modeling and vector auto regression 
analysis, they find that terrorism has a significant negative influence on FDI. In Spain, an 
average year’s worth of terrorist events reduces annual FDI by 13.5 percent; in Greece it 
reduces by 11.9 percent.  
 
Evrensel and Kutan (2007) focus on Indonesia and the impact of political 
instability and risk on FDI. They measure political instability using armed conflict, social 
unrest, ethnic tensions, and the average number of assassinations and revolutions. They 
create a political risk index using language, ethnic and religious fractionalization, 
demonstrations, and street violence. 
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The scope of both of these studies is limited due to their focus on just a few 
countries. Their results cannot be generalized to the rest of the world, or even to larger 
geographical regions, because it will not factor in other influential observations such as 
the economic, political and cultural differences. As an example, Enders and Sandler only 
consider the impact of seven anti-capitalist and Marxist groups such as The Basque 
Fatherland and Liberty in Spain, who primarily attack businesses with the aim of 
discouraging foreign investments. However there exist other terrorist groups such as the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka who target civilians and assassinate 
political figures to achieve their goals, and whose actions might not impact FDI so 
directly (Subramanian, 1999). 
 
Schneider and Frey (1985) conduct a larger scale study on the political 
determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in fifty four countries. Their results 
show that demonstrations, riots, strikes, assassinations of political figures, coup d’états, 
and civil wars create incertitude amongst decision-makers, and causes them to undertake 
less direct investments. Although their country sample is very diverse, they only study 
the effects across three years, which is not enough to observe long term trends. 
 
Not all studies show a significant negative relationship between conflict and FDI 
– some yield contradictory results, such as a study done at Pennsylvania State University 
which conducts a time-series analysis of 129 countries. It analyzes the impact of 
anticipated and unanticipated terrorism on FDI, and results indicate that neither type of 
terrorism has an impact on FDI inflows. 
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Although these results challenge our intuitive assumption that a rational investor 
will be risk averse, Wagner (2006) explains this investor mindset as a result of the “lure 
of profit”. If the payoff is high enough, it can offset associated risks in a venture.  
 
Most studies however find a negative correlation between conflict and FDI. In a 
recent Harvard study, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) hypothesize that when investors 
can diversify their investment country portfolio, terrorism results in a decrease in FDI in 
a host country and a large movement of capital across countries. 
 
Two seminal studies that have been pioneers in studying the terror-FDI link are 
by Busse and Hefeker (2007), and Blomberg and Mody (2007). These conduct a time- 
series analysis across a large sample of countries, utilizing one of the most 
comprehensive data sets on transnational terrorist events. This same data set is used in 
this study, and is described in detail in the Data section. 
 
Busse and Hefeker (2007) explore FDI indicators, and their results show that 
governmental stability, religious tensions, and democratic accountability are the three 
most important political risk indicators that impact FDI.   
 
Blomberg and Mody (2007) study the impact of violence on trade and bilateral 
FDI flows between 12 source countries and 43 host countries. Their study focuses on the 
impact of conflict on FDI divided by level of country development, horizontal and 
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vertical FDI, and types of violence. Their results indicate that violence has a significant 
negative impact on FDI and trade, and that host country violence in a developed country 
has a weakly significant positive correlation with FDI. For developing countries, 
increased host country violence induces a shift of horizontal FDI to vertical FDI. A 
substantial portion of developed country FDI is vertical, and although violence deters 
vertical FDI, firms substitute for that decline in business by engaging in more horizontal 
FDI. 
 
When it comes to sector-specific FDI analysis, the literature is rather scanty, and 
most studies correlate economic indicators - and not political indicators - with FDI flows. 
One of the few such sector-specific studies is by Enders, et al (1992) which has looked at 
the impact of terrorism on European tourism revenue. Their findings indicate a 
significant negative correlation between political violence and tourism in Greece, Italy, 
and Austria, but not in countries such as France, Germany and Norway.  In a sense, their 
study has only partially validated the conventional wisdom that a climate of security is a 
prerequisite for the success of industries such as tourism. 
 
Another study has examined the link between political conflict and tourism, but 
this has come to different conclusions.  Steiner (2010) has analyzed the impact of 
political risk and political violence on FDI flows in the tourism sector in Egypt, and 
surprisingly the results of this study do not indicate any clear relationship whatsoever.  
That itself is rather telling, especially given the perpetual state of unrest in Egypt. This 
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hints at the fact that FDI investors in the tourism sector, especially in developing 
countries, may actually be more resilient and risk-taking than is commonly imagined. 
 
Mihalache (2010) presents one of the few studies which analyze the impact of 
violence on FDI across sectors, and its results indicate differentiated relationship across 
different economic sectors. This study finds that political violence does have a significant 
negative impact on FDI flows in mining, manufacturing, construction, transportation and 
infrastructure sectors, but not in agriculture, footloose manufacturing1 and finance 
sectors.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
This section describes the sources, and limitations, of data for both international violence 
and FDI. 
 
3.1. Measure of Transnational Terrorism 
 
The source for information on terrorist incidents is obtained from the International 
Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) data set by Mickolus et al. (2002). 
The data set attempts to quantify transnational terrorist acts, and presents one of the most 
                                                 
1
 The term “footloose manufacturing” refers to manufacturing models that are designed to minimize the 
impact of economic and political uncertainties by outsourcing many tasks outside the firm, thereby 
allowing relatively greater ease in moving production from one geographic location to another.  IKEA and 
Nike are good examples of this. In comparison, Toyota, HewLett-Packard and Samsung, are typically more 
rooted to their location because they use their own production and supply chain facilities. 
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comprehensive data sets of terrorist incidents for 179 countries from 1968 till present. It 
defines an international terrorist event as the following: 
 
“the use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for 
political purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in 
opposition to established governmental authority, when such action is intended 
to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the 
immediate victims and when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its 
perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the 
mechanics of its resolution, its ramifications transcend national boundaries.” 
(Mickolus et al, 2002). 
 
As such, events like the Oklahoma City bombing which do not fall into this 
definition of a terrorist event, but might have had a significant impact on the study, are 
not taken into account, (Blomberg et al, 2004), limiting the study. 
 
ITERATE data is obtained from a combination of scholarly publications, 
interviews with government officials and victims, and a manual search through electronic 
and print media (Flemming et al, 2008). Media and news organizations however are not 
primary sources of data, and oftentimes details are inaccurately reported either 
unintentionally or to aid government agencies in covering up the full impact of events. 
This creates another limitation, as many of the data categories are not entirely accurate.  
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The raw data in the ITERATE data set is divided into four distinct files – the 
common file, hostage file, fate file, and skyjack file – and I focus my study on data from 
the common file. This includes terrorist event timings, information on terrorist groups, 
victim characteristics, and the quantification of damages.  The first variable that I utilize 
is the annual number of terrorist incidents reported (nr_cflct). This is the most consistent 
ITERATE data set measure, and I use it as the primary measure of international terrorism 
in my regression models. I also include the annual number of civilians wounded 
(nr_wound) and the annual number killed (nr_kill) due to terrorist events. I sum these two 
variables to generate my final variable (nr_victim), which represents the number of 
victims. 
 
3.2. Measures of Foreign Direct Investment 
 
The source for data on FDI flows is the International Direct Investment Database of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which has defined 
FDI as: 
 
“a category of cross-border investment made by a resident in one economy (the 
direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an 
enterprise (the direct investment enterprise) that is resident in an economy 
other than that of the direct investor… The “lasting interest” is evidenced when 
the direct investor owns at least 10% of the voting power of the direct 
investment enterprise.” (OECD, 2008) 
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This data set contains FDI data for its 34 member countries, in both local currency 
and US dollar value, from 1985 to 2009. In order to uphold consistency I only consider 
the US dollar values, which are given in millions of US dollars and which are calculated 
by taking price and exchange rate changes into account.  
 
In addition to total FDI, each country has FDI data for 12 industrial sectors, which 
are further divided into 45 sub sectors. Some of these sub sectors are defined in a non-
exclusive manner, such as ‘post and telecommunications’, ‘post and courier activities’, 
and ‘telecommunications’, giving rise to the issue of double counting. Since removing 
only the overlapping sectors would bias my sample, I decided to remove all of the sub 
sectors and use only the broad industrial categories in my study.  
 
Although FDI is presented as both inflows and outflows for each sector, I limit 
my focus to FDI inflows in order to isolate the impact that host country terrorism has on 
foreign investments. Countries calculate FDI inflow data by only recording the 
directional change in investment, not the total stock. Thus when a foreign investor sells 
part of the equity held in the investment venture, or when the direct investment enterprise 
buys back its shares from the direct investor, a negative value for FDI may be observed 
(OECD, 2010). From the data set, the FDI inflow of -$118,000,000 in USA’s Agriculture 
and Fishing sector in 1994 indicates that in that year, there was an $18 million 
disinvestment in assets. 
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Of the 34 OECD member countries, three countries were filtered out for lack of 
data, and one country was removed because it is not included in the ITERATE data set. 
In addition, data for sector specific FDI is available from 1985 onwards, while ITERATE 
has data until 2007. Thus my data set consists of FDI inflows for 30 countries, across 12 
sectors, and over a period of 23 years. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
The study starts off by examining sample wide trends in FDI inflows and terrorism. Table 
1 portrays the average total FDI and average number of terrorist events across time. Note 
that there appears to be a seemingly consistent, inverse relationship between the two. In 
order to statistically quantify this relationship, a regression model is created which 
includes country and year dummies in order to control for their other influential variables 
that cannot be observed. The size of a country and its economy may impact FDI, and so 
population and real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is included to check for 
country size. The following regression model relates total FDI with terrorism for a 
country i and year t: 
 
totalfdi it = α0 + nr_cflct it + α2nr_victim it + α3lnpop it + α4lngdp it + α5 FEi + α6 FEt + ε it              
 
where totalfdi is the annual FDI by country, nr_cflct is the number of terrorist 
events, nr_victim is the number of individuals wounded or killed due to terrorist events, 
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lnpop is the log of country population, lngdp is the log of real Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita, FEi is the country dummy, and FEt is the year dummy. These variables 
and their sources are described in Appendix A. 
 
The study’s main interest lies in the impact that terrorism has on FDI by sector, 
and for this a similar model is generated, adding a sector dummy. The model is for a 
given sector j, and is expressed as follows: 
 
fdi ijt = α0 + nr_cflct it + α2nr_victim it + α3lnpop it + α4lngdp it + α5 FEi + α6 FEj + FEt + ε ijt                   
 
where fdi ijt is the annual FDI for all countries by sector, FEj is the sector dummy, 
and all the remaining variables are the same as above.  
 
The country, sector and year dummies should control for as many omitted 
variables as possible, while the inclusion of population and GDP should be an appropriate 
check for country size. It would be interesting to see which particular sectors are 
significantly impacted by terrorism, and so a model is generated which keeps the sector 
fixed (j*) in order to isolate the impact on that specific sector. The model is as follows: 
 
fdi ij*t = α0 + nr_cflct it + α2nr_victim it + α3lnpop it + α4lngdp it + ε ijt                                     
 
where fdi ij*t is the annual FDI for all sample countries, keeping the sector constant. 
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5. Results 
 
5.1 Total FDI Model 
 
Table 2 explores the correlation between total FDI and the number of terrorist incidents 
and victims. The regression model includes the logarithms of country population and real 
GDP per-capita, in order to account for differences in country size that could skew 
results. The models in columns 3-8 utilize dummy variables for country and year, in order 
to control for possible omitted variables. The models in columns 7 and 8 use both dummy 
variables. Columns 1 and 2 portray a normal model without fixed effects. 
 
All combinations of the model indicate the existence of a negative relationship 
between total FDI and the number of terrorist incidents, and while models 5 and 6 are not 
statistically significant, the rest are at the 1 percent level. This indicates that when there is 
an additional terrorist incident in a given country, one observes a decline in FDI inflows.  
The model indicates that the number of victims from terrorist events has a slight positive 
correlation with FDI. 
 
Population and real GDP per-capita have a significant positive correlation with 
FDI, except in models 7 and 8. These are the models with country and year dummies, 
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which indicate that there are specific country and year combinations for which other 
influential observations impact population and real GDP per-capita. 
 
When the year dummy is implemented, the value of the coefficient for the number 
of terrorist events drastically reduces, and is no longer significant. This indicates that 
there are other influential variables and events which impact the number of terrorist 
events over time. Indeed, larger political and economic developments of a region often 
influence investor risk perception. The results indicate that the sample countries observed 
significant global or regional developments within the timeframe of the study that 
influenced their FDI inflows.  
 
For instance, 1989-1992 represent a period of extreme political volatility in 
Europe. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, Germany was unified and the Soviet empire 
finally broke up into numerous independent nations.  During this time, FDI inflows into 
many of the sample countries dropped dramatically 
 
Similarly, the dotcom-related stock market crash of 2000 hurt many private equity 
groups and banks in both the US and Europe. Looking back at table 1, note that this 
resulted in global FDI inflows falling sharply again for a few years, only regaining its 
earlier peak by 2006. 
 
The R2 value for the model that includes all variables along with the year dummy 
is 0.3618, implying that 36.18 percent of the variation in FDI is explained by the model. 
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When the country dummy is added, the R2 value is 0.6444, indicating that 64.44 percent 
of the variation in total FDI is explained by the model. The low R2 value for just the year 
dummy model, along with the significant increase in the model fit when the country 
dummy is added, reinforces the above supposition that there are other influential factors 
across time which impacts influences investor decision making. 
 
5.2 Sector FDI Model 
 
The result of the sector FDI model is presented in Table 3. A country, sector and 
time dummy is utilized in models 3 to 10, with models 9 and 10 including all three. 
Overall, a significant negative relationship is observed between FDI by sector and the 
number of terrorist events. Although there appears to be a significant positive relationship 
between the number of victims and FDI, the coefficients are so small that in terms of US 
dollar amounts the FDI increase is not very large. 
 
Note that just as in the total FDI model, when the year dummy is implemented, 
the value of the coefficient for the number of terrorist events drastically reduces, and is 
no longer significant. This indicates that there are other influential variables and events 
which impact the number of terrorist events over time. Similarly, when the country 
dummy is implemented, the value of the coefficient for the number of victims killed 
drastically reduces, and is no longer significant. This indicates that there are other 
country specific influential observations which the models do not account for, which 
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impacts how a potential foreign investor perceives the risk associated with the number of 
victims from terrorist events.  
 
When country, year, and sector dummies are included together, we observe a 
decrease in the coefficient value and significance, for the number of conflicts. This 
indicates that there are other influential observations for specific country, sector and year 
combinations, which impact the way a potential foreign investor perceives risk associated 
with terrorist events. 
 
5.3 FDI by Individual Sectors  Model 
 
The impact of terrorism on the FDI inflows of individual sectors is isolated, and 
although the coefficients for the number of terrorist events are negative for every sector, 
only 3 of them are significant. The three sectors are manufacturing, trade and repair, and 
construction. The results are presented in Table 4. 
 
The coefficient values make it appears as though the manufacturing industry has a 
much larger correlation with terrorist events than the other sectors. However these results 
do not account for sector size, which determines how considerable the change in FDI 
inflows is, and so one cannot compare these coefficients at face value. To account for 
this, average FDI inflow in each sector is generated, and used with the coefficients in 
each model to calculate the percentage change in FDI inflow, as shown in Table 3. Note 
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that for all three sectors, the percentage decrease in FDI is within a range of 0.47 percent, 
and so the impact by sector is not very differentiated. 
 
The results indicate that investors from different sectors do not respond to 
terrorism in a homogeneous manner, and their risk-taking ability is often influenced by 
the source of capital, intensity of physical assets (IPA), and the location substitutability of 
the investment. 
 
This is why the three sectors most adversely affected by terrorism are 
manufacturing, construction and retail sectors. The manufacturing sector refers to the 
large scale production of goods such as food products, clothing, medicines, appliances, 
and motor vehicles. The trade and repairs industry deals with the sale of high-value retail 
goods such as appliances, electronics, computers and automobiles. The construction 
sector includes the activities related to the construction, demolition, and renovation of 
structures. The common thread which connects them to each other, and to terrorist events, 
is their heavy dependence on physical assets, either as machinery, factory assets or 
precious inventory. 
 
As for the statistical insignificance of remaining sectors, especially the hotels and 
restaurants sector – the nature of the country sample accounts for some of the results. 
OECD countries are mostly developed and diversified economies, which are more 
resilient to external shocks, including terrorism. In such economies, there is usually a fast 
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recovery of public trust and investor confidence because of the resources and responses 
of the government. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This study has attempted to conduct an empirical investigation on the linkage between 
terrorist violence and FDI inflows, focusing on developed countries where political 
violence is a relatively newer phenomenon as compared to many developing countries in 
Asia, Africa or the Middle East.   
   
In consonance with past research by others, this study has shown a significant but 
inconsistent relationship between terrorist violence and foreign direct investment. 
Investors in different sectors do not appear to respond to terrorism in a homogeneous 
manner, and their ability to absorb or discount future risk appears to be influenced by 
other economic or political factors.  The most negatively impacted economic sectors are 
those that have a higher percentage of useful assets tied up in physical forms on the 
ground, which matches our intuitive understanding of the real risks involved in different 
industries.     
   
While the results of this study are not radical, they do add another layer of 
understanding to previous research.  While it might appear rather obvious that violence of 
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any kind should deter FDI, the actual relationship between terror and FDI has become 
more complex in the last two decades, and reflects the increasing diversity of investor 
profiles, risk appetites and other palliative factors in an environment where companies 
are increasingly looking to invest abroad in order to cut costs and tap newer markets.  
   
Going forward, it may be useful and interesting to study the correlation between 
terrorism and investors differentiated by their ownership or debt structure – such as 
private equity groups, state-owned enterprises, highly leveraged companies and 
employee-owned firms.  
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8. Appendix A: Key Variables of Interest 
 
fdi denotes the value of Foreign Direct Investment inflows into host countries, for a given 
industrial sector. It is denoted in millions of US dollars. Source: The International Direct 
Investment Database of OECD. 
 
nr_cflct is the annual number of terrorist events that occur in each country, and the data 
is collected using print and electronic media to observe results. Source: ITERATE data 
set. 
 
nr_victim is a variable that I generated by summing nr_kill and nr_wound, in order to 
represent the total number of individuals who were victimized by terrorist incidents, by 
country and year. Source: ITERATE data set. 
 
nr_kill is the annual number of individuals who were killed as a result of terrorist 
incidents, by country. Source: ITERATE data set. 
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nr_wound is the total number of individuals by country and year who were physically 
harmed and who required medical attention as a result of terrorist incidents. This does not 
include individuals who later died from their injuries. Source: ITERATE data set. 
 
lnpop denotes the population of each country by year, in log terms. Source: the 
International Direct Investment Database of OECD. 
 
lngdp denotes the real Gross Domestic Product per capita of each country in log terms. 
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
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Year 
 
Total FDI Number of Terrorist Events 
1985 2225.77 9.79 
1986 3514.44 8.80 
1987 5341.81 6.86 
1988 6106.50 5.82 
1989 7960.02 4.32 
1990 7186.47 3.96 
1991 5077.04 10.96 
1992 4564.22 5.22 
1993 6005.33 11.43 
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9. Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Trends in FDI and Terrorist Events from 1985-2007 
 
Note: This table portrays the trends in annual FDI and number of terrorist events over time. The first 
column represents the year, from 1985-2007. The second column represents average total FDI for all 
sample countries, in millions of US dollars. The third column represents the average number of terrorist 
events that occurred each year. 
 
 
 
 
1994 6674.48 2.39 
1995 8993.58 2.71 
1996 9819.22 1.88 
1997 12065.59 1.88 
1998 21151.10 0.50 
1999 30937.58 0.96 
2000 40967.53 0.69 
2001 20400.49 0.48 
2002 19792.63 1.03 
2003 15839.14 1.07 
2004 17726.00 1.24 
2005 25597.69 0.38 
2006 35265.09 0.20 
2007 54403.62 0.40 
  
 
 
Table 2: Country-wide Impact of Terrorism on FDI 
 
Notes: standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively. Each column 
shows a regression model estimated from 1985-2007 for 30 countries. Columns 3-4 and 5-6 include fixed effects for country and year respectively, and 
columns 7 and 8 include fixed effects for both country and year together. Variables in the regression are: annual total FDI inflows by country (totalfdi), the 
annual number of terrorist events (nr_cflct) and individuals wounded or killed by terrorist events (nr_victim) by country, the logarithm of real GDP per capita 
(lngdp), the logarithm of country population (lnpop), and dummy variables for country and year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
Country 
F.E. 
4 
Country 
F.E. 
5 
Year 
F.E. 
6 
Year 
F.E. 
7 
Country, Year 
F.E. 
8 
Country,Year 
F.E. 
nr_cflct -311.19** 
[128.95] 
-371.78*** 
[130.65] 
-367.40*** 
[111.43] 
-370.47*** 
[112.77] 
-92.05 
[130.06] 
-162.23 
[131.62] 
-311.89*** 
[109.12] 
-327.06*** 
[110.08] 
nr_victim  5.29** 
[2.12] 
 .32 
[1.72] 
 5.78*** 
[2.05] 
 1.72 
[1.65] 
lnpop 9307.97*** 
[890.22] 
9121.51*** 
[889.32] 
97362.88*** 
[28061.15] 
96812.96*** 
[28245.52] 
9030.31*** 
[849.09] 
8826.45*** 
[846.84] 
57836.22* 
[33619.31] 
54117.16 
[33804.98] 
lngdp 31597.16*** 
[2864.24] 
32083.08*** 
[2857.82] 
45307.27*** 
[9622.12] 
45399.38*** 
[9643.86] 
26895.06*** 
[2808.08] 
27542.43*** 
[2799.83] 
2051.61 
[15056.58] 
2127.27 
[15055.46] 
Observations 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 
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Table 3: Sector-wide Impact of Terrorism on FDI 
 
 
Notes: standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively. Each column 
shows a regression model estimated from 1985-2007 for 30 countries. Columns 3-4, 5-6, and 7-8 include fixed effects for country, sector, and year 
respectively. Columns 9 and 10 include fixed effects for country, sector, and year together. Variables in the regression are: annual FDI inflows for each 
country by sector (fdi), the annual number of terrorist events (nr_cflct) and individuals wounded or killed by terrorist events (nr_victim) by country, the 
logarithm of real GDP per capita (lngdp), the logarithm of country population (lnpop), and dummy variables for country, sector, and year. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
Country 
4 
Country 
5 
Sector 
6 
Sector 
7 
Year 
8 
Year 
9 
Country, 
Sector, Year 
10 
Country, 
Sector, Year 
nr_cflct -30.99*** 
[10.63] 
-38.08*** 
[10.77] 
-28.00** 
[11.49] 
-30.49*** 
[11.59] 
-29.65*** 
[10.41] 
-36.84*** 
[10.54] 
-11.91 
[11.32] 
-19.93* 
[11.46] 
-19.80* 
[11.79] 
-22.96* 
[11.87] 
nr_victim  .67*** 
[.17] 
 .28 
[.18] 
 .69*** 
[.17] 
 .74*** 
[.17] 
 .41** 
[.18] 
lnpop 991.66*** 
[78.66] 
963.52*** 
[78.87] 
10538.96*** 
[3431.83] 
10144.53*** 
[3440.66] 
1014.51*** 
[76.99] 
986.05*** 
[77.18] 
1017.41*** 
[78.51] 
984.85*** 
[78.74] 
4529.19 
[4180.98] 
3779.82 
[4191.62] 
lngdp 3338.16*** 
[260.13] 
3431.12*** 
[260.81] 
4908.29*** 
[1182.52] 
4997.19*** 
[1183.73] 
3256.31*** 
[254.63] 
3350.39*** 
[255.27] 
2938.78*** 
[265.64] 
3047.70*** 
[266.39] 
-1700.52 
[2032.05] 
-1628.74 
[2031.37] 
Observations 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 
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Table 4: Sector Models: Impact of Terrorism on FDI in the Manufacturing, Trade and Repairs, and 
Construction Sectors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively. Each column 
shows a sector specific regression model estimated from 1985-2007 for 30 countries. Columns 3-4, 5-6, and 7-8 include fixed effects for country, sector, and 
year respectively. Columns 9 and 10 include fixed effects for country, sector, and year together. The last row is not part of the regression models, and 
represents the percentage change in FDI inflows. It is calculated by dividing the coefficient from each model by the average FDI inflows for that sector, and 
multiplying by 100. Variables in the regression are: annual FDI inflows for each country by sector (fdi), the annual number of terrorist events (nr_cflct) and 
individuals wounded or killed by terrorist events (nr_victim) by country, the logarithm of real GDP per capita (lngdp), the logarithm of country population 
(lnpop), and dummy variables for country, sector, and year. 
 1 
Manufacturing 
2 
Manufacturing 
3 
Trade and 
Repairs 
4 
Trade and 
Repairs 
5 
Construction 
6 
Construction 
nr_cflct -105.84** 
[51.45] 
-117.31** 
[52.29] 
-32.14* 
[17.61] 
-33.78* 
[17.78] 
-3.27 
[2.03] 
-3.51* 
[2.06] 
nr_victim  1.02 
[.84] 
 .21 
[.31] 
 .019 
[.03] 
lnpop 3607.81*** 
[366.25] 
3569.86*** 
[367.41] 
1156.95*** 
[127.98] 
1148.94*** 
[128.59] 
69.56*** 
[14.794] 
68.82*** 
[14.86] 
lngdp 8310.35*** 
[1245.12] 
8437.49*** 
[1248.93] 
2955.95*** 
[432.07] 
2983.68*** 
[434.19] 
173.97*** 
[53.99] 
176.88*** 
[54.25] 
Observations 508 508 473 473 419 419 
percentage 
change in FDI 
inflow 
-2.29 -2.54 -2.07 -2.17 -2.25 -2.41 
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